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In Defence of Mercenarism
CE´CILE FABRE*
The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been characterized by the deployment of large private
military forces, under contract with the US administration. The use of so-called private military
corporations (PMCs) and, more generally, of mercenaries, has long attracted criticisms. This article
argues that under certain conditions (drawn from the Just War tradition), there is nothing inherently
objectionable about mercenarism. It begins by exposing a weakness in the most obvious justiﬁcation
for mercenarism, to wit, the justiﬁcation from freedom of occupational choice. It then deploys a less
obvious, but stronger, argument – one that appeals to the importance of enabling just defensive
killings. Finally, it rebuts ﬁve moral objections to mercenarism.
The growing role of so-called private military corporations such as Blackwater in recent
military conﬂicts has elicited concern from many commentators. Those companies offer a
wide range of services to states willing to pay for them, such as specialized training courses
for members of standing armies, the provision of security details in war zones, logistical
support by way of weapons and transport systems, and the deployment of combat troops.
It is commonly estimated that, by the end of 2006, there were about 20,000 euphemistically-
called ‘private contractors’ in Iraq – about three times as many as regular British soldiers.
Although states have relied on private ﬁrms and freelance mercenaries for military purposes
for centuries, private military corporations, to a greater extent than ever, are taking over
tasks and functions that used to be performed by the army itself.1
The prevalent normative view on the marketization of war is that it is morally wrong –
for reasons to be found, in part, in the medieval condemnation of mercenarism. In this
article, however, I argue that under certain conditions, mercenarism is morally legitimate.
* University of Edinburgh (email: c.fabre@ed.ac.uk). An earlier version of this article was presented
in 2008 in Stirling at the Philosophy Department Seminar, at the UK IVR Conference in Edinburgh and
at the Annual Conference for the Society for Applied Philosophy. I am grateful to participants at those
events for very useful discussions, and to James Pattison, Guy Sela, Albert Weale and two anonymous
Journal referees for written comments.
1 Blackwater changed its name to Xe in February 2009, but is still commonly referred to as Blackwater –
a practice I shall adopt here. For accounts of the privatization of war, and new forms of warfare in
general, see, e.g., I. Duyvesteyn and J. Angstrom, eds, Rethinking the Nature of War (London: Frank
Cass, 2005); M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity, 2006); H. Munkler, The New
Wars (Oxford: Polity, 2005). For typologies of PMCs and reviews of their activities in recent conﬂicts, see,
e.g., J. Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (London: Proﬁle
Books, 2007); D. D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005); C. Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of
Private Military Companies (London: Routledge, 2006); P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the
Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003), esp. chap. 1. The estimate of
the number of private contractors relative to the number of British soldiers in Iraq is quoted from Scahill,
Blackwater, p. 161; Avant, The Market for Force, p. 2, cites the same ﬁgure for 2004. Note that in this
article, I deal with private military corporations, rather than private security companies, to the extent that
the former, unlike the latter, are deployed in war theatres.
In the ﬁrst section, I expose a weakness in the most obvious justiﬁcation for mercenarism:
namely, the justiﬁcation from freedom of occupational choice. I then deploy a less
obvious, but stronger, argument – one that appeals to the importance of enabling just
defensive killings. In the next section, I rebut ﬁve moral objections to mercenarism.2
Four clariﬁcatory remarks are necessary before I begin. First, I shall restrict my
argument to the use of private armies by states rather than multinational corporations,
and as a means for the former to defend their interests abroad, rather than as a tool for
domestic policies.
Secondly, the difﬁculties attendant on deﬁning mercenarism are well known. Typically,
a mercenary is deﬁned as a soldier who ﬁghts in a foreign war essentially out of ﬁnancial
motives.3 Those two features – nationality and motivations – are standardly thought to
distinguish a mercenary from a uniformed soldier of a state’s armed forces. Yet, the
nationality criterion is problematic, since it implies, somewhat counter-intuitively, that an
American employee of Blackwater who ﬁghts in Iraq for the US government is not a
mercenary. By mercenary, then, I shall mean an individual who offers his military
expertise to a belligerent against payment, outside the state’s military recruitment and
training procedures, either directly to a party in a conﬂict, or through an employment
contract with a private military corporation. Unless otherwise stated, I shall use the word
‘mercenarism’ to refer to both kinds of private soldiers. At this juncture, for reasons to be
outlined below, I leave the motivations question open.
Thirdly, in justifying the (limited) marketization of war, I defend the view that all three
parties (individual private soldiers, private military corporations and states) sometimes
have the moral right, in the threefold sense of a liberty, a claim or a power, to contract
with one another for the purpose of waging a war. Rights, on my account, protect their
holders’ interests, so that for X to have a right to do j means that X’s interest in doing j
is important enough to be protected in certain ways. More speciﬁcally, to say that X is at
liberty to do j is to say that he is morally permitted to do f. To say that he has a claim to
do j is to say that third parties are under some duty to him in respect of his doing f. To
say that he has the power to do j is to say that, by doing f, he changes his moral
relationship to others by transferring to them some of his claims, liberties, powers and
immunities, and/or acquiring new ones. Thus, I shall argue that private soldiers, PMCs
and states sometimes are morally permitted to contract with one another for the purpose
of ﬁghting a war; that their liberty is sometimes protected by a claim against third parties
that they not interfere with such contracts by, for example, making them illegal; and that
2 Whether or not using private military corporations and/or private soldiers is the best way (function-
ally) to conduct a war is a separate question that I shall not address here. Functional concerns include, for
example, the practice by private actors of defaulting on their contractual duties when the military
situation of their employers is deteriorating, or the fact that contractual relationships (which set out ﬁxed
rights and duties) are not suited to the conduct of war (which requires ﬂexible and quick decisions under
changeable circumstances.) See, e.g., Avant, The Market for Force, and M. Schmitt, ‘Humanitarian Law
and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees’, Chicago Journal of
International Law, 5 (2005), 511–46.
3 See art. 1 of the 1989 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and
Training of Mercenaries, and art. 47 of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949. For discussions of those deﬁnitional difﬁculties, see, e.g., S. Percy,Mercenaries: The History
of a Norm in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chap. 2; C. A. J. Coady,
Morality and Political Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), chap. 10; H. C. Burmester,
‘The Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries in Armed Conﬂicts’, American Journal of International Law, 12
(1978), 37–56.
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it is sometimes protected by a power so to transact such that the new distribution of
claims, privileges, liabilities and powers which the contract establishes is recognized by
third parties as binding. For terminological convenience, and unless otherwise speciﬁed,
when I say that they have the right to enter into a mercenary contract, I shall say that they
have a liberty, a claim and a power to do so.4
Finally, nothing I say in this article is meant to support the use to which nations such
as the United States put private soldiers and private military corporations (PMCs) in
conﬂicts such as the Iraq War. Nor is my argument for mercenarism in any way meant to
support the well-documented exactions that have been perpetrated by private soldiers
in various conﬂicts.5 To put it emphatically, my claim is that, under strict conditions
(which current practices do not meet), the marketization of war is not morally wrong.
Those conditions, in a nutshell, are drawn from the Just War tradition. I shall assume that
a war is just if it is fought for a just cause by a belligerent which ensures, as far as possible,
that the harms done by the war do not exceed the good it brings about. In addition,
individual soldiers who ﬁght in the war must also respect the principles of proportionality,
necessity and non-combatant immunity when deciding when and how to mount their
attacks, as well as whom to target.6 If, and only if, those conditions are met, there is no
reason to reject marketized soldiering as morally unjustiﬁable.
IN DEFENCE OF THE (LIMITED) MARKETIZATION OF WAR
Arguments for or against the marketization of war must deal with the following questions:
(1) On what grounds, if any, does an individual have the right to offer his services (to kill,
or to assist in killing) under the terms of a private contract (either directly between
him and a belligerent state, or between him and a corporation)?
(2) On what grounds, if any, does a belligerent state have the right to hire mercenaries or
PMCs to protect its interests?
(3) On what grounds, if any, does a PMC have the right to act as an intermediary
between a belligerent state and individual soldiers willing to offer their services?
A negative or positive answer to one of those three questions will sometimes, but not
always, yield a correspondingly negative or positive answer to the other two – whether
liberties, claims or powers are at issue. Thus, the claim that hiring oneself to kill others is
morally wrong (for example, on the grounds that one should never kill for gain) does not
commit its proponents to the view that hiring a private soldier is morally wrong: for,
4 For the interest theory of rights, see, e.g., J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1986), and M. Kramer, ‘Rights without Trimmings’, in M. Kramer, H. Steiner and N. Simmonds, A
Debate over Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 7–112. For the distinction between
claims, powers and liberties, see W. N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1919).
5 See, e.g., evidence of abuse perpetrated by so-called private contractors (as well as US soldiers) at the
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in 2003. The report on the ofﬁcial investigation into such abuses can be found
at http://ﬂ1.ﬁndlaw.com/news.ﬁndlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf (accessed on 23 February
2009). See also reports of killings of civilian bystanders in Iraq by private contractors in an October 2007
memorandum prepared for the Oversight Committee of the US Congress House of Representatives
(http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071001121609.pdf – accessed on 23/02/09).
6 Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, 4th edn (New York: Basic Books, 2006) remains the locus
classicus in the ever-growing literature on the Just War. For the purpose of this article, I need not provide
a full speciﬁcation of the conditions for a Just War.
In Defence of Mercenarism 541
although it does make the recruiter complicitous in the soldier’s wrongdoing, the need for
the latter’s service might be so great as to provide him with a justiﬁcation (and not merely
an excuse) for so acting. Likewise, one can coherently claim that a private soldier is acting
permissibly by killing for gain, but that his employers are guilty of, for example,
exploiting his need to make a living or treating him merely as a killing machine rather
than a human being.
With these preliminary considerations in hand, I now turn to defending mercenary
contracts. As I noted at the outset, the most obvious argument in their support invokes
the value of freedom of occupational choice. I argue in this section that it fails, in so far as
it cannot support belligerents’ right to hire mercenaries (next subsection). I then argue
that mercenary contracts are better justiﬁed by appealing to the importance of enabling
just defensive killings (second subsection). Having thus defended mercenarism, I conclude
this section with a few words on the moral status of private armies.
Freedom of Occupational Choice
An individual, or a group, enjoys the contractual freedom to earn a living if they are able
to exchange services, money or both with some other party with a view to beneﬁting
ﬁnancially from the transaction. This supposes, at the very least, that there should be no
legal ban on the provision of those speciﬁc services or ﬁnancial resources. Compare now
the following scenarios:
(a) Blue decides to enlist into the standing professional army of his home state. He knows
that he might be deployed anywhere in the world as thought ﬁt by his superiors, and
that he will kill some other human being(s).
(b) White ﬁnds a job with a PMC that has successfully won a number of government
contracts. He knows that he might be deployed anywhere in the world as thought ﬁt
by his employers, and that he will kill some other human being(s).
(c) Red sets up a business as a freelance mercenary. He hires himself out to different
kinds of belligerents for different tasks, from participating in active combat to
training professional soldiers for specialized roles on the front line. Unlike White, he
has considerable control over where he is deployed and for what purposes.
In all three cases, the soldier knows that he will either kill or be complicitous in acts of
killing, and will be paid for doing precisely that. The only difference between Blue, on the
one hand, and White and Red, on the other hand, is that Blue is formally part of the
state’s apparatus, whereas the latter two are not. At ﬁrst glance, that difference seems
irrelevant. For if one believes that freedom of occupational choice is important – a point
which I take as ﬁxed – and if one believes that it is (sometimes) permissible to exercise it
by killing others, then it is hard to see why one is morally permitted to exercise it in the
formal service of a state, but neither as an employee of a private corporation nor as a
freelance soldier. By the same token, if Blue’s interest in joining the army is important
enough to be protected by a claim, then the same applies to White’s and Red’s interests.7
Similar considerations apply to private military corporations. A PMC, as we saw, acts as
an intermediary between belligerents on the one hand, and individuals willing to offer
7 For an argument along those lines, see F. Suarez, ‘De Bello’, in his De Triplici Virtute Theologica,
Fide, Spe, et Charitate, VI, 12, reproduced in J. B. Scott, ed., Selections from Three Works of Francisco
Suarez, S. J. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944).
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their lethal services on the other. It advertises for openings, recruits employees, trains
them, offers them logistical support, oversees their career, monitors their performance,
etc. These tasks are carried out by lawyers, human resources personnel, advertising
personnel, administrative assistants and accountants, in just the same way as the tasks
that enable individuals to join, and effectively perform in, a regular army are carried out
by lawyers, human resources personnel, etc. At the bar of freedom of occupational choice,
then, if someone’s interest in earning a living by, for example, working as a recruiter for
the army ought to be protected by a claim and a liberty, then so should her interest in
working as a human resources adviser for a PMC. And so on.
As should be clear, however, a state, qua state, is not properly to be regarded as
engaging in activities that would enable it to make a living. Consequently, the foregoing
argument cannot support the conferral on states of a right to enter a mercenary contract,
from which it follows that freedom of occupational choice cannot, on its own, support
mercenary contracts. For on the account of rights which I espouse, X has a right in
respect of an interest of his if that interest warrants protection. In so far as freedom of
occupational choice is not an interest of a state, a state cannot have a right – and therefore
cannot have a power – to enter into a mercenary contract at the bar of that particular
value. Thus, freedom of occupational choice, may well support mercenaries’ and PMCs’
liberty and claim to do so; but in so far as it cannot support states’ similar power, it
cannot support mercenaries’ and PMCs’ power to enter into a contract with the state.
Indeed, it is a necessary condition, for A to have the power to make a transaction with B,
that B also has that power – and vice versa. Suppose that A and B agree that A will sell B
his car for £5,000. Assume that A’s interest in being able to divest himself of his property
is important enough to confer on him a power to change his, and others’ relationship to it,
by selling it. However, A cannot have the power to transfer his car to B in exchange for
B’s £5,000 if B does not herself have the power to transfer £5,000 to A in exchange for his
car. Accordingly, any argument to the effect that the transaction ought to be regarded as
valid must show that both A and B have the power to enter into that kind of contract –
and, by implication, that some interest of both A and B is important enough to be
protected by the relevant power.8 As we have just seen, freedom of occupational choice is
not an interest of states. In order, then, to defend the view that mercenary contracts as
between a state and mercenaries (or PMCs) are legitimate, we shall have to identify some
interest(s) of states that can be protected by the relevant powers.
Just Defensive Killings
The foregoing considerations should not be taken to imply that freedom of occupational
choice has no role to play in justifying states’ right to enter mercenary contracts. Indeed, it
might well be in the interest of a state – call it S1 – that individuals’ freedom of occupa-
tional choice, which they exercise by hiring themselves out as mercenaries or by working
in a PMC, be respected. In such a case, though, the interest which justiﬁes S1’s right is,
ultimately, that which is fulﬁlled by respecting individuals’ freedom of occupational
choice. To illustrate: suppose that White’s employer wins a government bid to send a
8 Generally, it is not a necessary condition for a change in A and B’s moral/legal relationship validly to
take place that both A and B have the relevant power (if A gives G to B, A thereby changes their moral
relationship in respect of G, without B having to exercise the same power). Here, however, I focus on
exchanges.
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number of (private) soldiers to help ﬁght a justiﬁed humanitarian war against a genocidal
tyrant. White, in that war, might be assigned to combat duties; or he might be assigned to
a security detail for the protection of some high-ranking ofﬁcial, with licence to kill if
necessary. Or suppose his employer wins a bid to help a foreign government ﬁght a war of
national self-defence against an unjust act of aggression. In all those cases, White kills in
defence of others: in defence of those whose lives are threatened by their own genocidal
government; in defence of the high-ranking ofﬁcial; and in defence of the national interest
of the state whose government hired his company.
Now, I take it for granted that one is permitted, and has a claim, at least prima facie, to
exercise one’s freedom of occupational choice by offering goods and services (against pay) in
justiﬁed defence of other people’s lives, and of other states’ economic or national interests.
Thus, a group of food producers surely can sell food to whatever organization will then
distribute it to the starving. A doctor surely can offer his medical services, against pay, and
via the state and/or medical insurance companies, to those who need them as a matter of life
and death. Likewise, an aspiring diplomat surely can offer his services, again against pay-
ment, in the service of his country’s defence of its national interests, particularly in times of
war. An information technician surely can offer her services to a company that is particularly
vulnerable to hackers. And so on. If that is correct, as it surely is, then White too can become
a private soldier in defence of third parties’ fundamental interests.
To be sure, unlike White, those agents contribute to saving the lives or protecting
the interests of others without thereby contributing to killing someone else. It is hard to
see, however, why that should make a difference to the issue at hand. Take the case of
weapons manufacturers, who sell guns to those who need them so as to defend their life or
protect the national interest. If they can do so even though the assistance that they
provide involves a contribution to an act of killing, then private soldiers and PMCs can
(respectively) offer and procure killing services.9
I have argued that individuals can hire themselves out for killing services, as well as
procure such services, in so far as, by doing so, they provide some other party with the
resources it needs to rightfully defend itself against an unjust threat. The latter point –
pertaining to just defensive killings – also provides a justiﬁcation for conferring on states
the right to hire mercenaries. Consider: states need armies and weapons, not only for the
purpose of collective self-defence (to point out the obvious), but also for the purpose of
defending distant strangers (when called upon to wage a war of intervention), as well as
for the purpose of enforcing universally valid norms (when called upon to take part in
multilateral peace-keeping forces.) Put bluntly, states need the wherewithal to have acts of
killing carried out in their name and with their authorization, in self-defence as well as in
defence of others. Now, if a state is at liberty to buy guns from private manufacturers for
the aforementioned purposes – as it surely is – then it is also at liberty to buy soldiering
services from those willing to provide them. Moreover, if a state has a right to pay for a
standing army – as it surely does – then it also has a right to pay for a private army.
Finally, recall my earlier point, to the effect that an individual’s interest in working as a
private soldier ought to be protected by rights that neither PMCs nor states be themselves
interfered with when hiring him, and that third parties recognize his employment contract
9 In my ‘Mandatory Rescue Killing’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 15 (2007), 363–84, at pp. 366–8, I
argue that giving a gun to someone who needs it in self-defence, and killing (for free) that person’s
attacker, are relevantly analogous. The argument applies, mutatis mutandis, to the act of selling a gun and
the act of killing against payment.
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with them as legally binding. Likewise, states’ interest in hiring a private army ought to be
protected by similar rights as pertain to private soldiers and PMCs.
In sum, whereas the argument for freedom of occupational choice failed to provide a
justiﬁcation for states’ power to enter into mercenary contracts (and thereby for mercenaries’
and PMCs’ similar power), the argument from just defensive killings can do so. That said,
whilst the view that states are at liberty to hire mercenaries is relatively straightforward, the
view that they have a claim and a power to do so needs unpacking. As I noted in the
introduction, to say that X has a claim to do j is to say that third parties are under a duty
not to interfere with his doing f. Moreover, to say that he has the power to do j is to say
that, by doing f, he changes his moral relationship to others by transferring to them some of
his claims, liberties, powers and immunities, and/or acquiring new ones. A contract whereby
X hires Y for a particular service against a certain fee is a paradigmatic example of the
exercise of a power, whereby X loses his entitlement to that sum of money, but acquires
claims over Y’s use of his time and skills to the ends speciﬁed by the contract. For X to have
that power thus requires that third parties recognize it as a valid transaction, so that, should
a dispute arise between X and Y, either could seek redress through some institution.
Standardly, the third party which is under the relevant duty not to interfere (when a claim
is at issue), or to recognize a transaction as valid (when a power is at issue) is, more often than
not, the state. Accordingly, when the state itself is said to have claims and powers, identifying
who exactly is supposed, respectively, not to interfere, or to recognize the transaction as valid,
is of the utmost importance. As the institutional embodiment of a political community as a
whole, a state’s claim to do j (for example, to buy weapons for the purpose of ﬁghting a just
war) is held against those of its individual members who might wish to stand in the way of its
doing j (such as radical paciﬁsts who destroy the state’s military factories). Likewise, a state’s
power to enter into a contract with some other party (for example, a contract for the delivery
of ammunition) ought to be recognized as valid by those of its individual members who might
wish to reject the new distribution of claims, privileges and powers (by, for example, refusing
to accept that the state is now the legitimate owner of the ammunition). Crucially for our
present purposes, however, states’ claims and powers are also held against other states. To
say, then, that a state, S1, has a claim to hire mercenaries to ﬁght just wars is to hold other
states – say, S2 – under a duty not to interfere with the transaction, for example by preventing
mercenaries from joining in. It is also to say that S2 ought to recognize as valid the
employment contracts passed by S1 and the mercenaries or PMCs.
None of this is to deny, of course, that S2 might have countervailing and important
interests that would be harmed by S1’s decision to contract with mercenaries – particularly if
those mercenaries are citizens of S2. In that case, S2’s interests might take precedence over
S1’s, so that it would not be under a duty not to interfere with the latter’s decision. Note,
however, that the same considerations might well apply, mutatis mutandis, to S1’s decision to
raise, or increase the size of, its regular standing army, for example, by setting up in its midst
foreign regiments akin to the Gurkhas or the Foreign Legion. In that case too, one might
draw the conclusion that S2 is not under the relevant duty to S1. The point remains, then,
that if S1’s interest in obtaining what they need for their collective self-defence or for the
defence of others is important enough to be protected by a right to set up a standing army,
then it should also be protected by a right to contract with private parties.
To recapitulate, I have argued that states, PMCs and individual soldiers have the right to
contract with one another. Note that my argument and its conclusion are compatible with the
widely held view that it is better, on the whole, that states should have their own standing
army than having to resort to private forces – that there is something to be gained (for
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example, with respect to national cohesiveness) by having one’s national interests defended by
one’s compatriots. My point is simply that the reasons that are routinely thought to support
the conferral of the moral right to enter a commercial contract when some fundamental
interests are at stake extend to mercenary contracts – unless one can show that soldiering
somehow differs, morally speaking, from other kinds of activities.10 I shall examine some
arguments to that effect in the next section, and show that they fail. In the meantime, it is
worth emphasizing what this article is not claiming – that one can choose to make a living
however one wishes. An argument for unbridled freedom of occupational choice would lead
to the absurd conclusion that Luca Brazzi, Don Corleone’s top henchman, has the moral
right to offer his killing services to the latter against shopkeepers who refuse to pay protection
money, or that the Maﬁa has the right to procure killing services for corrupt politicians who
wish to eliminate their political opponents. That conclusion would be absurd simply because,
in those two examples, the acts of killing are straightforwardly impermissible. Analogously,
whether or not individuals may offer, or procure, killing services to belligerents depends on
the justice of the war. So does belligerents’ right to contract with private soldiers. If the war is
unjust, parties’ interests in, respectively, freedom of occupational choice and getting the
means to kill in self-defence or the defence of others are not important enough to be protected
by liberties, claims and powers. By implication, if the contracting state wages a just war, and
if individuals’ interest in joining the army is important enough to be protected by a right, then
individuals’ similar interest as exercised outside army structures ought also to be protected by
a right. In the next subsection, I probe the implications of that claim for the moral status of
private and uniformed soldiers at the bar of Just War ethics.
The Moral Status of Private and Public Armies
The task of Just War ethics consists in deciding who, in war, may kill whom with moral and
legal impunity. According to the tradition, uniformed combatants may intentionally kill other
soldiers without being liable to punishment (subject to considerations of necessity and pro-
portionality). Should they be captured by the enemy, they must be regarded as prisoners of
war and be treated as stipulated by the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War. By implication, civilians, who are not themselves legitimate targets, may
not kill soldiers (unless the latter wrongfully target them, in which case their acts of killing are
justiﬁable acts of self-defence). If they do so, they are to be treated as murderers and tried
accordingly; in addition, should they be made prisoners by the enemy, they do not have the
rights and privileges normally extended to prisoners of war.
There are exceptions to the principle, of course. Thus, articles 1(4) and 44(3) of the 1977
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 Relative to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conﬂicts extend the protection enjoyed by soldiers to members
10 As a referee for this Journal pointed out, my argument for mercenarism, which appeals to the value
of enabling Just War killings, raises the interesting issue of the extent to which a PMC’s contractual
obligations to state A may be allowed to override a non-contracting state B’s urgent need for military
manpower. Should the PMC be allowed to default on the contract it made with A at time t1, so as to help
B whose needs at time t2 are more pressing? Or should it be held to its contractual obligations to A? Of
course, the issue arises, not merely in the context of mercenarism, but whenever private actors are allowed
to contribute to helping those in need: if a company is under contract with hospital H1 for the delivery of
medical equipment, should it be allowed to default on its contract for the sake of supplying H2, which is
facing an unexpected shortage in surgical instruments? And so on. I lack the space to deal with those
complications here. Some of the concerns that they raise are ethical, whilst others are more functional (cf.
fn. 2).
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of national, or political, liberation movements. However, the international law of armed
conﬂicts does not confer the legal status of a soldier to mercenaries. Under the International
Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (1989), ‘a
mercenary, as deﬁned in article 1 of the present Convention, who participates directly in
hostilities or in a concerted act of violence, as the case may be, commits an offence for the
purposes of the Convention’ (art. 3.1). Although the Convention seems to target freelance
mercenaries, the terms in which it is phrased do not preclude its application to employees of
PMCs. According to international law, then, mercenaries are neither civilians nor soldiers: they
belong to that grey category of unlawful combatants, who are liable to being killed with
impunity (precisely in so far as they are combatants) but are denied the rights and privileges of
soldiers (precisely in so far as they are not members of regular armed forces).
Interestingly, employees of PMCs who are currently operating in Iraq enjoyed, for a long
time, greater rights and privileges than US soldiers. Indeed the label under which they are
commonly designated, that of ‘private contractors’, seems to suggest that they ought to be
regarded as civilians rather than combatants, and that they are not, therefore, legitimate
targets. In that vein, one of the last orders issued by Paul Bremner, before leaving his post as
head of Iraq’s provisional civilian government, removed private contractors suspected of war
crimes from Iraqi jurisdiction (CPA Order 17). Although the order allowed the United States
to prosecute those contractors, as does the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 10 USC
y3261(2000), no such employee was prosecuted for crimes committed in Iraq until December
2008. By contrast, while PMC employees enjoyed immunity, members of the US armed
forces were facing prosecution for war crimes.11
Yet, my arguments in support of the bestowal on private individuals of the right to hire
themselves out for killing purposes also support the thesis (which I shall call the moral
parity thesis) that mercenaries, whether freelance or PMC employees, should be treated
on a par with soldiers who enlist willingly12 into the army. Consider: if the status (eco-
nomic or political) of mercenaries’ employers is irrelevant to the issue of the former’s right
to offer their services in war, it should also be irrelevant to the issue of their liabilities,
rights and privileges during war. Put differently, to the extent that uniformed soldiers may
kill with impunity, so should mercenaries (or so I have argued above). Accordingly, to the
extent that the former may be killed with impunity, so should the latter; to the extent that
11 See, e.g., http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/28/national/28england.html, http://www.nytimes.com/
2005/01/28/international/middleeast/28abuse.html, and http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/06/washington/
06blackwater.html?_r51 (sources consulted on 22 February 2009). The US War Crimes Act (18 USC
y2441 (1996 and 2004)) provides that any American national or member of the US Armed Forces who
commits a war crime is liable to prosecution: it would thus apply to American, but not foreign, PMC
employees. In December 2008, US federal prosecutors charged ﬁve Blackwater guards with a shooting
that killed at least seventeen civilians in a crowded Baghdad square. For discussions of the legal status of
mercenaries and employees of PMCs, see, e.g., L. Cameron, ‘Private Military Companies: Their Status
under International Humanitarian Law and Its Impact on Their Regulation’, International Review of the
Red Cross, 88 (2006), 573–98; K. Fallah, ‘Corporate Actors: The Legal Status of Mercenaries in Armed
Conﬂict’, International Review of the Red Cross, 88 (2006), 599–611; E.-C. Gillard, ‘Business Goes to War:
Private Military/Security Companies and International Humanitarian Law’, International Review of the
Red Cross, 88 (2006), 525–72; L. Doswald-Beck, ‘Private Military Companies under International
Humanitarian Law’, in Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt, eds, From Mercenaries to Market: The
Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 115–39.
12 The qualiﬁcation is important. One might think, for example, that a conscript should not be subject
to as severe a punishment, for taking part in an unjust war, as a mercenary, precisely because he is subject
to considerable duress.
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the former should be prosecuted for war crimes, so should the latter; and to the extent
that the former should be granted the formal status of prisoners of war if captured, so
should the latter.13
At ﬁrst sight, it would seem that the foregoing considerations only apply to mercenaries,
freelance or otherwise, who directly take part in combat operations – and not to those who
offer training, protective and logistical support to regular forces. In so far as PMCs do not
usually deploy personnel in a combative capacity but, rather, assist combat units, it would
seem that the vast majority of their employees should be regarded as civilians rather than
combatants – but that would be jumping too quickly to a conclusion. The challenge resides
in identifying what constitutes ‘direct participation’. Taking part in an armed attack or
counter-attack clearly does, which includes in the category of legitimate targets Blackwater
employees who, alongside US soldiers, ﬁred at a crowd of protesters (some of them armed)
from the occupation headquarters in Najaf, Iraq, in April 2004.14 Whether or not assisting
in attacks and counter-attacks also counts as direct participation in hostilities is harder to
determine. Whilst bringing ammunition to regular forces is plausibly seen as such, pro-
viding security for military headquarters may not. Whilst providing training to jetﬁghters
during the war itself can also plausibly count as participation in the latter’s subsequent
attacks, merely guarding military installations may not – and so on.
These are difﬁcult issues, but the crucial point here is that they arise in just the same
way for regular forces: some soldiers take a direct part in ﬁghting, while others ‘merely’
provide logistical support to combat units. Accordingly, the moral parity thesis applies to
those cases as well. If uniformed soldiers who do not directly take part in combat are not
legitimate targets, on the grounds that they are not themselves posing an ongoing or
imminent lethal threat to the enemy, mercenaries who provide logistical assistance to
combat units ought not to be killed either.
The question of mercenaries’ liability to being punished for war crimes is harder, at
least in cases where those crimes are committed outside the territory of the belligerent who
has hired mercenaries, and by individuals who are not nationals of that belligerent state.
As I noted above, US legislation allows for the prosecution of such crimes, but not all
states do. As a result, individual mercenaries of different nationalities who together
commit a war crime might well face different kinds of penal costs – not a particularly
desirable state of affairs at the bar of fairness. If, however, one takes the plausible view
that a belligerent state has the right (and, indeed, the duty) to punish its uniformed
soldiers for war crimes whether or not they are nationals of that state, then there is
no principled reason to exempt foreign mercenaries who are contracted to ﬁght its wars
from punishment by that state.15
13 That claim is compatible with the (plausible) view that there are differences between armies’ and
private companies’ duties and permissions before the war starts – such that, e.g., the army is under a
collective duty to go to war as ordered by its (civilian) political leaders, but a private company is not under
a duty to accept a government’s contract to ﬁght in that war. For interesting discussions of differential
liabilities for uniformed soldiers and mercenaries, see J. Pattison, ‘Just War Theory and the Privatization
of Military Force’, Ethics and International Affairs, 22 (2008), 143–62, and Coady, Morality and Political
Violence, pp. 226ff (though Coady is sceptical of the legitimacy of mercenarism).
14 See Scahill, Blackwater, chap. 8.
15 On that plausible view, France and Britain have the right (and the duty) to punish, respectively, non-
French members of the Foreign Legion and Gurkhas. See Avant, The Market for Force, pp. 233–5, for a
discussion of the difﬁculties raised by jurisdictional confusion over extraterritorial punishment in recent
conﬂicts.
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There is one important difference, of course, between PMCs’ employees and uniformed
soldiers, namely that the former, unlike the latter, might be placed under two different sets
of duties. On the one hand, they are under a duty to their employer to carry out the tasks
speciﬁed in their employment contract. On the other hand, they are also under a duty to
obey the orders given to them by the ofﬁcers in charge of military operations on the
ground. By contrast, uniformed soldiers are located within one uniﬁed chain of command.
Still, this does not affect my case for treating both kinds of combatants on a par with
respect to their liability to being punished for war crimes. Clearly, it is conceivable that a
mercenary might be given conﬂicting orders by his employer and the military ofﬁcer in
charge of operations, such that the former would make him liable to being punished while
the latter would not. It is also conceivable that a mercenary might be threatened with
being sacked by his employer if he refuses to carry out his contractual duties, when the
latter are at odds with the order he receives from the uniformed commanding ofﬁcer. On
either count, however, a regulatory measure ensuring that PMC employees should obey
orders as given by military personnel in charge of operations ought to take care of this
difﬁculty. A further measure specifying that no PMC employee could ever be held under
contractual duties, by their employer, to act in contravention of the law of war, should
also do the trick. With those measures in place, then, mercenaries can and ought to be
treated as if they were uniformed soldiers.
So far, I have focused on individual mercenaries. Yet, the status of PMCs themselves is
also at issue. If their employees are liable to being killed, are their executives similarly
liable, and are their company headquarters legitimate targets for destructive bombings? If
their mercenary employees are liable to being punished, are their executives similarly
liable? It seems that they are. If, in times of war, the military staff of a belligerent are liable
to being either killed or punished for war crimes, so should PMCs’ executives – which is to
say that they ought not to be granted the protection standardly afforded to civilians.
Admittedly, there is a difference between the two kinds of institution: PMC executives
do not (let us assume) take the decision to go to war in the ﬁrst instance; nor, once the war
has started, do they make the strategic and tactical decisions that will result in enemy
deaths. Yet, the fact that they, unlike high-ranking ofﬁcers, do not make those decisions is
irrelevant to their liability to being killed or put on trial for participating in an unjust war.
For consider the case of weapons factories. As a number of Just War theorists have
argued, targeting those installations and the civilians who work in them is permissible,
precisely in so far as they provide direct military support to combatants, even though they
might be located far away from the lines, and even though their contribution to the war
effort is that of accomplices, rather than principals, in the war. But if providing support
such as weapons can turn manufacturers into legitimate targets and make them liable to
being tried for war crimes, then, by the same token, providing support in the form not
merely of equipment but also of combatants themselves can turn PMC executives into
legitimate targets and possible defendants in war crime trials.16
16 For the view that ammunition factories and their workers are liable to being bombed, see, e.g.,
E. Anscombe, ‘War and Massacre’, and ‘Mr Truman’s Decree’, in E. Anscombe, Ethics, Religion and
Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 53 and 67, respectively; T. Nagel, ‘War
and Massacre’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (1972), 123–44, at pp. 139–40; O. O’Donovan, The Just
War Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 38–9 and 41–2; Walzer, Just and
Unjust Wars, p. 145. Regarding liability to punishment, a number of leading industrialists from Flick,
Krupp and IG Farben were tried in 1947–48 for complicity in Nazi Germany’s war crimes.
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Much more needs to be said on that issue. Treated in full, it would require an account
of corporate responsibility for acts committed by individual employees, as well as an
account of senior ofﬁcers’ liability for the acts committed by rank-and-ﬁle soldiers. My
point, however, is that if one endorses the deliberate targeting of the enemy’s military
headquarters (both the building and those who work in it), then one is committed to the
view that the deliberate targeting of the headquarters of PMCs who supply the enemy
with crucial military support is also permissible. Likewise, if one takes the view that
superior ofﬁcers can and ought to be held legally liable for the acts committed by their
subordinates, one must accept that PMC executives can and ought to be held legally liable
for the acts committed by their employees.
Before addressing objections to the conclusions reached here, I should like to tie up
a loose end. I have argued so far that mercenaries and PMCs on the one hand, and
uniformed soldiers and the army on the other hand, should be granted similar rights and
liabilities. I also argued (earlier in this section) that mercenarism is justiﬁed if, and only if,
the war in which mercenaries ﬁght is a just war. It follows, then, that public soldiering is
similarly justiﬁed if, and only if, the war is just. That is, if belligerents’ right to hire a
private army is conditional upon the war being just, and if private and standing public
armies enjoy the same rights and liabilities, then it follows that a state may send its
standing army into a war only if the latter is just. Likewise, if individuals’ right to hire
themselves out for acts of killing is conditional upon the war being just, then any such act
that they commit in an unjust war is itself impermissible,17 and should be regarded as
murder (for which its author should be put on trial). And if that is correct, then it follows
that uniformed soldiers themselves may not kill in an unjust war. The point might seem
obvious. Yet, it contradicts a rather fundamental principle of the Just War tradition,
namely that the justice, or lack thereof, of acts of killing once the war has started (jus in
bello) is independent of the justice, or lack thereof, of the decision to go to war in the ﬁrst
instance (jus ad bellum). My defence of mercenarism implies, on the contrary, that jus in
bello is heavily dependent on jus ad bellum.18
FIVE OBJECTIONS TO MERCENARISM
To recapitulate, I have defended the right to enter a mercenary contract by appealing to
the importance of enabling just defensive killings. I have also argued that uniformed
soldiers and mercenaries should be treated on a par – and that what matters, for deciding
whether a combatant is lawful or unlawful, is not the nature (political or economic) of the
organization employing him, but rather whether he abides by the principles of the Just
War. In this section, I examine and reject ﬁve objections to mercenarism: the motivational
objection; the objectiﬁcation objection; the proﬁteering objection; the loss of control
objection; and the neutrality objection.
The Motivational Objection
The claim that mercenaries are acting wrongly because they ﬁght for ﬁnancial gain, rather
than out of loyalty to their state and/or commitment to a just cause, has a very long
17 Unless the lethal threat against which they are defending themselves is itself unjust.
18 For a different argument in favour of the dependence of jus in bello on jus ad bellum, see, e.g.,
J. McMahan, ‘The Ethics of Killing in War’, Ethics, 114 (2004), 693–733.
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pedigree in the intellectual and legal history of warfare. It draws on one of the traditional
conditions of the just war, namely, that a war is just only if belligerents wage war with the
right intentions (deﬁned as wanting to redress the wrong which justiﬁes the war), and
applies the requirement to the individuals who ﬁght in the war. Incidentally, the condition
of right intentions is ambiguous, requiring as it does either that belligerents and soldiers
act from the right motives, or that they wage, and kill in, a war towards just ends. As
applied to mercenaries, the condition is usually interpreted as pertaining to agents’
motives; accordingly, it is this particular interpretation that I shall target here.19
As has been often noted, any argument for, or against, a particular act that appeals to
the agent’s motivations is vulnerable to two criticisms: (1) that discerning what those
motivations are is not as easy as it might seem; (2) that motives are irrelevant to the
permissibility of actions. For what it is worth, I do not ﬁnd either claim persuasive. But
even if the motivational objection’s fundamental premises are correct (that motives are
discernible and do matter), it is nevertheless vulnerable to the following criticisms. For a
start, there is no reason to suppose that a member of the regular armed forces by deﬁnition
is not motivated mostly by ﬁnancial gain and the social beneﬁts that go with it, or is
mainly motivated by loyalty to her state and/or to a just cause. In fact, joining the army is,
for many youngsters in many countries, a way out of poverty. It is also, for many of them,
a way to channel aggressive tendencies, or to cater for a psychological need for a highly
structured and hierarchically-based way of life. By contrast, there is no reason to suppose
that a mercenary is, by deﬁnition, motivated mostly by the lure of ﬁnancial gain. On the
contrary, evidence suggests that a number of private soldiers take up jobs with PMCs
after being made redundant by the army or after retirement from combat duties, and see
themselves as continuing to act in the defence of their country’s interests abroad.20
The foregoing points are deﬁnitional. So let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that a
mercenary, unlike a regular soldier, just is someone who is essentially motivated by
money. The crucial question, then, is whether those deﬁnitional points have any bearing
on the right to enter a mercenary contract. Two claims are usually made to the effect that
they do. First, it is said that soldiers have the right to kill only if they believe, at least
in large part, that the war is just. In so far as mercenaries by deﬁnition do not have
those motives, mercenarism is morally dubious – whether seen from the standpoint of
mercenaries themselves, or of those who procure or hire them.
However, even if motives are decisive for the permissibility of actions, and thus even if
mercenaries are guilty of wrongdoing, it does not follow that they lack a claim, or a
power, to contract with belligerents. This is because, deﬁnitionally speaking, there can be
19 For the distinction, in this context, between right motives and just aims (or, as he calls them,
intentions), see Pattison, ‘Just War Theory and the Privatization of Military Force’. For a comprehensive
review of the motivational objection to mercenarism, see Percy, The History of a Norm in International
Relations, esp. chap. 5. See also F. H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1975), chap. 6. Two classical thinkers who condemn mercenaries on motivational
grounds are Machiavelli in The Prince (ed. by G. Bull) (Harmondsworth, Midx.: Penguin, 1981), chap.
XII, esp. pp. 77–8, and Grotius in The Rights of War and Peace (ed. by R. Tuck) (Indianapolis, Ind.:
Liberty Fund, 2005), Bk II, chap. XXV, yix, p. 1164. For a powerful rebuttal of the motivational objection
along the lines deployed in this paragraph and the next two, see T. Lynch and A. J. Walsh, ‘The Good
Mercenary?’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 8 (2000), 133–53.
20 See Scahill, Blackwater, esp. chap. 5. Suppose that uniformed soldiers in a given country decide to
leave the army en masse, unless their pay is signiﬁcantly raised. Would it be morally wrong of them to do
so? I owe this point to Alan Hamlin.
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such a thing as a claim, or a power, to act wrongly. Accordingly, the motivational
objection can successfully reject the conferral on mercenaries and PMCs of the relevant
claim and power only if it can provide an independent justiﬁcation for the view that this
particular wrongdoing ought not to be protected by the law.21
Such a justiﬁcation can only be that mercenaries’ and PMCs’ interest in, respectively,
offering, or procuring, lethal services is not important enough to be protected by a claim or
power. However, unless one can show that mercenarism so deﬁned harms more fundamental
interests of third parties (a point to which I shall return below), it seems that mercenaries’ and
PMCs’ interests are, in fact, important enough to warrant such protection. Individuals do all
sorts of things out of mostly ﬁnancial motivations. They often choose a particular line of
work, such as banking or consulting, rather than others, such as academia, largely because of
the money. They often decide to become doctors rather than nurses for similar reasons.
Granting that their interest in making such choices, however condemnable their motivation,
is important enough to be protected by a claim (against non-interference) and a power (to
enter the relevant employment contracts), it is hard to see how one could deny similar
protection to mercenaries. Mutatis mutandis, the point applies to executives and owners of
PMCs, who procure, rather than directly offer, lethal services.
I noted above that the harms accruing to third parties as a result of mercenarism count as a
good reason against conferring on mercenaries, PMCs and states the right to contract with
one another. Appositely, the second normative worry about mercenarism is that mercenaries,
precisely because they are ﬁghting for money, are much more likely to have unjust aims and
to commit offences against the laws of war than members of regular armed forces, who are
motivated by the belief that their cause is just.22 However, that claim is less persuasive than
may appear at ﬁrst sight. In the light of the long list of exactions committed against civilian
populations by regular forces, precisely on the grounds that their cause was just, the sugges-
tion that armed forces are more likely to abide by the laws of war than mercenaries seems
somewhat optimistic. One need only think of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army during the
Second World War, the French Army in Algeria during the war of independence (1954–62),
the US Army in Japan in the closing months of the Second World War (Hiroshima and
Nagasaki come to mind here) and the British Air Force in Germany during that war. It is
equally unclear, again judging on the basis of recent interstate wars, whether regular armies
are more likely than mercenaries to pursue just aims when making strategic decisions as to
whom to target, which kind of infrastructures to destroy, etc.
21 I deploy a structurally similar argument regarding organ sales, prostitution and surrogate mother-
hood in my Whose Body is it Anyway? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, chaps 6–8). To illustrate
here: suppose that White becomes a mercenary because he really enjoys killing. If motives are decisive to
the permissibility of actions, White is acting wrongly. But that is not enough to show that White ought not
to have the right to work as a mercenary – any more than the fact that someone becomes a surgeon
because he gets aroused by cutting into the ﬂesh of anaesthetized patients is enough to warrant legally
preventing him from being a surgeon. One would have to show that his perverse motives lead him to
provide sub-standard medical care to his patients.
22 In other words, to advert to the aforementioned distinction between two interpretations of the
requirement of just intentions, the worry is that, precisely because they have the wrong motives, mercenari-
es are more likely to act in pursuit of wrongful aims. See Pattison, ‘Just War Theory and the Privatization of
Military Force’, p. 147 and pp. 150–2. To return to the example given in fn. 21, if it turned out that
White’s appetite for killing made him prone to killing indiscriminately, then that would be sufﬁcient
warrant for preventing him (forcibly) from doing so. Likewise, if a surgeon’s appetite for cutting into
sleeping ﬂesh were to lead him to operate without a medical reason, that would be sufﬁcient warrant to
withdraw his licence (and put him into jail for inﬂicting grievous bodily harm on his patients).
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In any event, those points about unjust aims and exactions are vulnerable to the charge
that one may act out of wrong motives but nevertheless have just aims, or conduct oneself
justly. More precisely, it is not inherent in the act of offering one’s killing services in
exchange for money that it should lead the agent to commit atrocities against civilians and
to pursue unjust aims. Finally, it is worth noting that the freelance soldier, in so far as he
has greater control over the conditions under which he will be deployed, is in a better
position than the corporate ﬁghter or the professional soldier to ensure that he will not be
made to ﬁght for unjust ends or in unjust ways. On that count, making oneself available
for hire on a freelance basis might be less morally risky than joining the army and running
the risk of having to obey an unjust order on pain of being dishonourably discharged.
Although the motivational objection’s main target is mercenaries and PMCs (for
obvious reasons), it might nevertheless be thought to apply to states as well, as follows:
(a) to hire mercenaries to ﬁght one’s war is to countenance a wrongdoing, and (b) to
countenance a wrongdoing is itself a moral wrongdoing of a kind that should not be
protected by either a claim or a power. Assuming the motivational objection that
mercenarism is wrong, I will not take issue with (a). Claim (b), however, is too strong –
certainly in those cases where the state that hires mercenaries simply could not conduct its
(just) war otherwise, and particularly when its sovereignty and/or territorial integrity are
at stake. Perhaps, as Coady suggests in his interesting discussion of mercenarism, we have
here a case of dirty hands, where a leader has to choose between the wrongdoing of hiring
mercenaries and that of allowing the defeat of one’s community by an unjust attacker.23
Be that as it may, even if hiring mercenaries under those circumstances is morally wrong
(albeit the lesser of two wrongdoings), this would not in itself count as a reason to deny
the state the claim and the power so to act. Here again, absent countervailing arguments,
the belligerent’s interest in ﬁghting a just war surely is important enough to be protected
by a right to enter mercenary contracts. Consider the following analogy. Even if it is
wrong (arguendo) for someone to enter the medical profession mostly out of ﬁnancial
motives, and even if it is wrong for a patient to hire him, surely the patient’s interest in
surviving is important enough to grant him a right to do so. The alternative would be to
subject him to criminal sanctions, or to deny him the protection of the law if the doctor
breaches the contract (for example, by not providing the medical treatment which the
patient paid for). Likewise, the alternative, for the belligerent state, would be to be denied
the protection of its own laws if the mercenaries or PMCs it has hired default on their
contracts, as well as protection from interference, on the part of other states, with its
attempt to secure its own survival. And yet, just as the patient’s interest in remaining alive
surely deserves the twin protection of a claim and a power, so does the belligerent’s
interest in its own survival.
The Objectiﬁcation Objection
The motivational objection, which is the most familiar of those deployed against mercen-
arism, focuses on mercenaries rather than their employers. By contrast, the objectiﬁcation
objection targets the latter: according to the objection, hiring mercenaries is morally
wrong in so far as it consists in treating individuals as little more than both killing
machines and cannon fodder. As Kant puts it, ‘the hiring of men to kill or to be killed
seems to mean using them as mere machines and instruments in the hands of someone else
23 Coady, Morality and Political Violence, pp. 218–19.
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(the state), which cannot easily be reconciled with the rights of man in one’s own
person.’24 Similar arguments were raised in Britain at the time of the American War of
Independence, when Britain had to decide whether or not to recruit German mercenaries
to its cause.25 Interestingly, the objection is sometimes made against PMCs – with the
further twist that those companies, motivated as they are by the search for greater proﬁts,
are prone similarly to disregard their employees’ welfare. It has thus been alleged by the
families of the four Blackwater employees, who were ambushed, killed and dismembered
in Fallujah on 31 March 2004, that their employers had assigned them to a highly
dangerous mission with hardly any protection.26
Although the objectiﬁcation objection is not always meant to condemn mercenarism
while endorsing standing armies, it is nevertheless tempting to suppose that states are less
likely to treat their own uniformed soldiers as killing machines and cannon fodder –
particularly democratic states whose rulers are accountable to citizens, and particularly in
an age where body bags bring home the true horrors of wars fought in far-ﬂung corners of
the world. The point, however, should not be overstated, for two reasons. First, non-
democratic regimes are not noted for their respect for the lives of their soldiers: the
objection thus applies to those regimes as well as to the use by the state of private armies,
and there is nothing distinctively wrong, with respect to the objectiﬁcation of soldiers,
about the latter.
Secondly, the objectiﬁcation objection works best against practices that are con-
comitant to the hiring of private armies – such as the practice of not taking due care with
mercenaries’ lives. But it does not weaken the claim that states have the right to turn to
private soldiers or, for that matter, the claim that PMCs have the right to procure private
armies. By analogy, the claim that men who visit prostitutes are likely to treat them in
abusive ways does not entail that buying sexual services per se ought to be criminalized;
nor does it entail that transactions with prostitutes ought to be regarded as null and void.
In fact, all that the objectiﬁcation objection does (and that is in fact considerable, if
off target) is support the view that states have a duty of care to the private soldiers whom
they hire – just as they have a duty of care to their armed forces. More speciﬁcally, they
have a duty to deploy them in accordance with the jus in bello requirements of pro-
portionality (whereby the harms done by a particular tactical decision must not exceed the
good it brings about) and necessity (whereby states should risk soldiers’ –and civilians’ –
lives if and only if it would serve their (just) ends.) States which fail in that duty are
morally guilty of wrongdoing, lack the power to contract with private soldiers if they fail
to set out the ways in which they will discharge their duty of care to the latter, and are
morally liable for their negligence. States that abide by the aforementioned requirements
cannot be charged with moral wrongdoing simply for recruiting private soldiers rather
than, or alongside, regular forces. Similar considerations apply to PMCs: those that treat
their employees as little more than proﬁt-making and fungible entities lack the right so to
24 I. Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’, in H. Reiss, ed., Kant – Political Writings, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), p. 95. (See also Wilfred Burchett and Derek Roebuck, The Whores of War
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), for a similar objection in the context of the use of mercenaries in Africa
in the 1970s.) According to Kant, the important difference is not between private and standing armies but,
rather, between both kinds of armies on the one hand and occasional citizens’ armies on the other. He
claims that standing armies should be abolished, because ‘they constantly threaten other states with war
by the very fact that they are always prepared for it’ (‘Perpetual Peace’, p. 94).
25 See Percy, Mercenaries, pp. 152–3 and 160.
26 See Scahill, Blackwater, chaps. 5 and 13.
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employ them, and, thereby, the right to contract with states for their use. However, those
that fulﬁl their duty of care to their employees are left untouched by the objectiﬁcation
objection.
The Proﬁteering Objection
A third objection to mercenarism invokes the fact that individual mercenaries and PMCs
live off the suffering of others. More recently, PMCs have been criticized for proﬁteering
from the devastation brought about by war: they make a proﬁt by sending out private
armies that will cause considerable damage and destruction; they then make further
proﬁts by offering their protection services to the multinational corporations subsequently
entrusted by belligerents with the task of reconstructing the country. Put bluntly, they get
paid vast amounts of money for assisting in the reconstruction of countries which they were
paid similarly vast amounts of money to help destroy. And even if they do not contribute to
causing such destruction in the ﬁrst instance, they nevertheless proﬁt from the injustices that
war victims suffer.
Here again, the objection may well have a point in so far as it targets current practices
by states and PMCs, particularly in Iraq.27 Its point is limited, however, for although it is
true that PMCs do beneﬁt from war and its attendant unjust practices, so do weapons
manufacturers and ﬁrms that supply armies (whether regular or private) with food and
protective clothing. In fact, a vast range of private ﬁrms beneﬁt from other people’s
suffering, such as companies that manufacture medical equipment, private medical
practices, and ﬁrms that provide the means (such as helicopters, life-saving equipment,
engineering skills) for humanitarian relief, etc. Indeed, many professions would not exist
but for the fact that injustices have been committed – foremost amongst which is the legal
profession. Yet, to claim that those private ﬁrms, therefore, lack the right to contract with
states for those goods and services seems rather extreme. By the same token, the fact that
PMCs beneﬁt from the suffering and destruction wrought by war cannot alone render
their activities morally impermissible. In order to succeed, the objection would have to
show that there is something constitutively wrong about PMCs’ proﬁteering, which being
a lawyer or a manufacturer of medical equipment lacks. Yet, it is not clear how it could
establish that. The most obvious move that the objection could make, at this juncture,
would be to insist that there is something inherently wrong about making a proﬁt from
killing, or helping to kill, others. By contrast (it might say), a factory that manufactures
surgical instruments helps to save people’s lives without thereby contributing to the
deaths of others as a means to do so; likewise, there is nothing inherently unjust in helping
people seek rightful redress through the courts. However, that putative move would fail.
For surely, a ﬁrm that knowingly sells surgical instruments to doctors who practise
surgical experimentation on non-consenting patients lacks the right to do so; likewise, a
corrupt lawyer who helps his mobster clients defraud the state out of millions of pounds
in owed taxes is not acting within his rights. In just the same way, a PMC lacks the right
to hire private soldiers and offer their services to contracting states if the war in which it
ﬁghts is unjust. However, if the war is just, so that the deaths thus caused are not wrongful
deaths, there is no reason for concluding on the aforementioned grounds that the medical
factories and lawyers have the right to operate while PMCs do not.
27 This, in effect, is the thrust of Scahill’s critique of Blackwater’s activities. See his Blackwater, esp.
chap. 13.
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The Loss-of-Control Objection
The fourth objection to mercenarism applies neither to individual mercenaries nor to PMCs
but, rather, to states. It avers that by contracting with either kind of agents, but especially
PMCs, states lose exclusive control over the decision to use violence, as well as over the agents
by which it is used. And yet, the objection claims, there are good reasons for granting states
that kind of control. For states, in so far as they represent as well as articulate their members’
interests, are more likely to resort to, and control, violence for the sake of the common good,
rather than in defence of private interests. But when a state entrusts a PMC with the task of
ﬁghting its wars or assisting in the prosecution thereof, it is vulnerable to be unduly inﬂuenced
by the corporation over the conduct of its foreign policy. It is also unable effectively to
control the behaviour of the corporation’s employees, since the latter are accountable to the
corporation, and not to the state itself: by contrast, a regular soldier is liable to being court-
martialled if, for example, he commits exactions against enemy civilians. Finally, a state that
routinely appeals to PMCs as a means to resolve military conﬂicts is in danger of becoming
over-reliant on such ﬁrms at the expense of its own forces, which in turn might undermine its
ability to promote its own interests when the latter conﬂict with PMCs’ proﬁt-driven goals. In
other words, by hiring private armies, the state fails to do that which it is mandated to do,
that is to ensure that violence is used abroad only for the sake of the common good, and in
compliance with the laws of war. In so doing, it is guilty of a wrongdoing – and one of such
magnitude that its interest in so acting can be protected neither by a power to contract with
PMCs nor by a claim to do so.28
The objection draws considerable strength from the ways in which, in practice, nations
such as the United States are alleged to have given private military corporations such as
Blackwater some input into American foreign policy. Likewise, Paul Bremner’s afore-
mentioned decision to grant Blackwater employees immunity from prosecution for acts
perpetrated in Iraq has done little to assuage the worries of opponents to mercenarism.
However, proponents of the objection should beware the risk of overstating their case: any
potential belligerent, including states, must seek advice from military and security experts
when deciding whether or not to resort to war – if only because those experts, whether
members of the army or civilians, have a better claim to know whether a particular military
course of action has a reasonable chance of success. Including the actors who are not
elected leaders into the design of security policy is, therefore, essential. What the objection
must show, thus, is that private military contractors acquire undue inﬂuence over decisions
that are the state’s alone to take. The difﬁculty, of course, is that whether they do so is
entirely contingent on the facts of the cases. As a result, the objection is vulnerable to the
counter-claim that proper regulation might succeed in mitigating the problems arising from
belligerents’ loss of control over the transnational use of force. Such regulatory measures
might include, inter alia, clear rules for what constitutes an acceptable mercenary activity,
licensing regimes similar to those that already regulate the arms trade, providing ad-
equately for the prosecution and sanction of actors who fail to comply with those measures,
as well as publicly funding electoral campaigns so as to deprive corporations of the means
of leverage over presidential candidates. Moreover, account should be taken of the fact that
28 For a study of the ways in which PMCs have been able to inﬂuence US foreign policy, see Avant,
The Market for Force, esp. chap. 4, and D. Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 34ff. For worries about the loss of accountability attendant on states’
decisions to use PMCs, see, e.g., Singer, Corporate Warriors, chap. 10, and Pattison, ‘Just War Theory
and the Privatization of Military Force’, pp. 150ff.
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PMCs, like all other major corporations, are global in scope, which in turn requires a
transnational regulatory framework. Under those conditions, it is hard to see on what
grounds one can deny states a right to hire a private army.29
Moreover, the objection supposes that states have compliant and effective armed forces
at their disposal. Quite often, however, they do not, and are at the mercy either of their
own soldiers or of armed minority rebel groups that operate within their borders, more
often than not with the assistance or complicity of other states. In such cases, the state’s
decision to hire a private army will help it strengthen its control over the use of violence,
rather than undermine it. Thus, it is often argued that Sierra Leone, which was blighted
by civil war in the 1990s, was able to end the war only once they had brought Executive
Outcomes in. Likewise, it is also argued that Croatia, when under attack by Serbia, was
able to obtain some military successes in 1995 after entrusting Military Professional
Resources Inc. with the task of training and restructuring its troops. Under those con-
ditions, and to reiterate a point made earlier against the motivational objection, when a
state can defend itself only with the help of private soldiers, denying it, and its people, the
right to hire a private army is tantamount to denying it the right to avail itself of the
resources it needs for collective self-defence. To insist on doing so simply on the basis of
the status of such resources is a piece of fetishism.30
The Neutrality Objection
At various points in this article, I have argued for a duty not to interfere with a decision
by a mercenary or a PMC, respectively, to offer or procure lethal services, as well as a
duty not to interfere with a state’s decision to hire them. If states S1 and S3 are at war, S2
ought not to make it a criminal offence for its individual members to offer their military
services to S1, or for a PMC to operate from within its territory. In addition, S2 ought to
recognize as valid under the relevant statute the employment contracts passed between
individual mercenaries and PMCs.
The neutrality objection takes issue with that view. It claims that S2 not only may interfere
with its own members, PMCs, and, thereby, S1, but also that it ought to do so, on the grounds
that failure to thwart mercenary activities is tantamount to breaching the principle of neutrality.
According to the principle, states ought to remain neutral between belligerents whom they have
not explicitly undertaken to assist (typically through a treaty.) For S2 to allow some of its
members to offer their military services to S1 in the latter’s war against S3 is to fail to remain
neutral; as would be S2’s decision to let PMCs take sides in that war, from within S2’s territory.
If the objection is correct, then neither freelance mercenaries nor PMCs have a right to offer or
procure lethal services – services which states themselves do not have the right to buy.
Historically, there is strong evidence to suggest that the norm against mercenarism
evolved partly as a result of rulers’ awareness of the risks which their subjects’ mercenary
activities abroad posed to national interests.31 However, the neutrality objection is both
too narrow and too broad. It is too narrow, in so far as it fails to target the practice by a
29 For examples of ways in which to regulate PMCs, see, e.g., Avant, The Market for Force, chap. 4;
Singer, Corporate Warriors, chap. 15; and Chesterman and Lehnardt, eds, From Mercenaries to Market.
30 See Percy, Mercenaries, pp. 218–19, and Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, chap. 4,
for a strong argument along those lines. See Singer, Corporate Warriors, chaps 1, 7 and 8 for discussions
of the cases of Croatia and Sierra Leone.
31 See, e.g., Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns (Princeton, Conn.: Princeton University
Press, 1994), esp. chap. 3.
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state of hiring its own nationals as mercenaries. To be sure, if mercenarism consists in
hiring foreign nationals, then it is vulnerable to the objection. As we saw in the ﬁrst
section, however, this deﬁnitional move is not convincing, since (to repeat) it implies that
an American employee of Blackwater who ﬁghts in Iraq is not a mercenary. Moreover,
the objection is too broad, in so far as it also rejects, by implication, the enlistment by
individuals into the army of a foreign state. Of course, it is true that a number of
international conventions (such as the 1907 Hague Convention regarding the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers) and domestic laws (such as the 1870 British Foreign Enlistment
Act) bar individuals from so doing. The difﬁculty, though, is that by the same token,
France and Britain, to name but those two, would have been morally entitled, indeed would
have been under a moral duty, to block enlistment by their own nationals into the Inter-
national Brigades during the Spanish Civil War. It is worth noting, in fact, that the British
government did not, in that instance, enforce the Foreign Enlistment Act against British
volunteers who went to Spain. Whatever their reasons might have been for allowing
enlistment in that war, the claim that they were under a moral duty to enforce the Act pushes
the requirement of neutrality too far, for reasons to be considered presently.
The neutrality objection, then, only works, if it works at all, against some kinds of
mercenarism, but not all of them. In any event, it does not work. It assumes, ﬁrst, that
states ought to remain neutral, and, secondly, that they are accountable for the activities
of their individual members, as well of the corporate entities that act from within their
territory. Both assumptions are problematic.32 Take the latter. It is simply not true that
an act of killing carried out by a national of a state implicates that state (assuming of
course, as is the case here, that the killing is not carried out on the latter’s authority). If
Green, a citizen of Britain residing in Germany, murders a German for political motives,
Britain will not be deemed responsible by the German government for that act simply in
virtue of Green’s nationality. Why should it be any different in the context of a war?
The objection’s ﬁrst assumption does not fare much better. The view that a state may
never take sides in a war unless bound by a prior treaty is tantamount to claiming that
someone may never take sides in a conﬂict opposing two individuals unless bound by a
prior promise, even when one of them is under a lethal threat at the hands of an unjust
attacker. But if a victim of an attack has a right to kill her unjust attacker in self-defence,
then surely she also has a right to ask a third party for assistance.33 And if that is the
case, then the latter may come to her help. By analogy, then, if S1 is under an unjust threat
from S3, and if it is entitled to wage a war of self-defence against the latter, prima facie it is
also entitled to call for S2’s help. One way in which S2 may act in defence of S1 (for
example) is by not forbidding its own members to offer their services to S1, and by
allowing PMCs to operate within its territory.
The foregoing points imply that S2 ought not to come to S1’s assistance, even in those
limited ways, if S1’s war is unjust. This suggests that the neutrality objection ought to be
recast as the claim that a state may not facilitate the commission by (some of) their
members of wrongdoing against another state, in that instance, S3.
34 However, the
objection so recast does not undermine mercenarism itself so much as the wrongful uses to
which its actors sometimes put it. As such, it is wholly compatible with the view I have
32 Burmester, ‘The Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries in Armed Conﬂicts’, pp. 41–7.
33 For a fuller argument to that effect, see my ‘Permissible Rescue Killings’, Proceedings of the Aristo-
telian Society, 109 (2009), 149–64.
34 Burmester, ‘The Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries in Armed Conﬂicts’, p. 44.
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defended throughout this article, namely that if the war is just, then there is little reason to
deem marketized soldiering morally unjustiﬁable.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, I have argued that if the war is just, individuals have the right to hire themselves
out for military service; states have the right to contract with them for that purpose; and
private military corporations have the right to act as intermediaries between them. Under
those conditions, mercenarism, whether it involves freelance mercenaries and states, or takes
the form of a triangular relationship involving PMCs, is morally legitimate. As I have also
noted, however, once the war has started, private soldiers and PMCs should be treated on a
par with uniformed soldiers and public military organizations.
I should like to end by sketchily addressing three worries concerning the article’s conclu-
sion.35 The ﬁrst worry is that, extending the right to ﬁght in war to private actors would in all
likelihood increase the range of actors who take part in unjust conﬂicts, since PMCs and
mercenaries are likely to not be too concerned with the justice, or lack thereof, of the cause
for which they are hired: more generally put, the more actors are allowed to kill in war, the
greater the incidence of unjust violence in the world. Now, I agree that if, as a matter of fact,
the use of PMCs and mercenaries to ﬁght on the same terms as regular, uniformed soldiers
were to lead to increased levels of violence, then that would provide the international com-
munity with a good reason, all things considered, to outlaw them. However, the international
community should also, by that token, impose similarly harsh sanctions on the use by states
of their own armies to further unjust ends. If diminishing levels of unjust violence is a good
reason to narrow the range and number of military actors (as it surely is), then it applies to all
(and only) those actors who engage in such violence, whether or not they are uniformed
soldiers of state armies, or private military actors. In other words, faced with that particular
worry, one should uphold the moral parity thesis (whereby mercenaries ought to be treated in
exactly the same way as regular uniformed soldiers), not jettison it.
And yet, the second worry is that the moral parity thesis trivializes the case for mercenarism.
Put differently, once constrained by the requirements of a just war, mercenarism is not a
distinctive institution, and providing a justiﬁcation for it is not such an important task after all.
Perhaps that is so, but in the light of the standardmoral objections raised against mercenarism,
it is worthwhile to show that, under those conditions at least, it is morally justiﬁed.
The third worry is that my argument for mercenarism implies that a vast range of
tasks, which we normally think should be performed only by the state, can in fact be
outsourced to private actors – such as adjudicating disputes between citizens, running
prisons, policing our neighbourhoods, etc. By way of reply, let me simply make the
following observation: even if the arguments from freedom of occupational choice and
the ethics of assistance which I deploy here support the privatization of other essential
services, there might nevertheless be some disanalogies between public and private pro-
vision in those cases, such that the latter lacks justiﬁcation, all things considered. In
particular, it might be that the right to punish is different from the right to kill in such
ways that privatizing the latter does not commit us to privatizing the former.
35 All four were raised, in one way or another, at the various meetings where I have presented earlier
versions of this article. I am grateful to an anonymous Journal referee for pressing me on the ﬁrst one,
which also arises in connection with another claim I defend elsewhere, to wit, that private individuals
as such are sometimes permitted to go to war in defence of their rights. See my ‘Cosmopolitanism,
Legitimate Authority and the Just War’, International Affairs, 84 (2008), 963–76.
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